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The Necessity of Implementing a
Public-Health Approach to
Humanitarian Demining
Clearing mines is expensive, and demining programs
usually consume funding before reaching the task of
mine removal. The authors suggest ways to make
demining more practical, effective and economical using a "public-health" approach.
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Introduction

Landmines are an epidemic, yet
unlike other programs fighting epidemics, humanitarian demining does
not co nscienriously appl y publichealth techniques. National mineclearing projeers conform ro inflexible
military models that maximize cenrral
control while stifli ng local initiative.
Inrensive mine-at-a-rime clearing efforts, though urgent in heavily trafficked areas, are applied across the
board, dissipating demining resources.
This makes reducing risks across large
areas and populations impossible, resulting in continuing and unnecessary
deaths from unaddressed mine fields.
C learing every mine field is beyond the world's demonstrated willingness to expend capital. Speeding
reclamation and reducing casualties
within existing resources requires more
emphasis on overall risk reductio n,
more efficient methods and technologies and increased incentives for private action.
Public-health programs do this by
balancing what is best for ind ividuals
with what is best for all. Expensive
acute care, such as caring for rhe sick
during cholera epidemics, is the
smaller parr of rhe solution; the larger

part is generalized threat reduction
(e.g., provid ing reliable, potable water systems). The goal is to achieve the
highest society-wide health benefit for
the available funds, which are always
insufficient.
A public- health approach in
demining would optimize efforts to
greatly reduce risk in concentrated areas where civilian exposure is extreme
and needs are urgent (e.g., clearing
paths to wells and schools), and moderately reduce risk over very large areas (e.g., locating and marking mine
fields without clearing them, conducting mine awareness education andestablishing lasting community response
teams).
The wider perspective of publichealth programming stresses coordinatio n and cooperation with other
o rganizations to cut costs for activities such as victim rehabilitation, economic development and employment
generation. Not only are overall risks
and casualties reduced for given ourlays, bu r co mmunities an d their
economies also recover faster.
Humanitarian demining is more
than reducing postwar injuries. It is
also meanr ro build rhe conditions for
a stable peace and a robust prosperity.
Improving the whole public health is
as imporrant as eliminating individual
threats.
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Why Conventional De mining Is
So Expensive

Manua l demining is rhe go ld
standard for near- 100 percent removal. However, the inherent risks
eviscera te individual productivity.
C hecking for booby traps, clearing
vegetatio n, probing carefully, digging
up numerous suspicious objects and
rotating crewmembers to deter stress
and boredom requires multitudes of
low-skill ed detection personnel. With
more than 3,000 personnel, for instance, the Cambodian Mine Action
Center (CMAC) cleared only 10 sq
km a year out of some 3,500 affected
sq km. As a consequen ce, labor costs
are astrono mical.
Bureaucratic facro rs also increase
costs. Centralization robs the tooth of
clearing activities by concentrating
excessive resources in the bureaucratic
tail. Relying on peacekeeping forces
and national armies for leadership, the
organ iza ti onal mod els for rhese
projects, not surprisingly, are military.
Though appropriate for combat, when
applied to mine clearance, this model
is inefficient, nor economical, stifling
ro local initiative and adaptation, and
slow ro respond to new or newly-discovered beneficiary needs. Experimentation is directed from above, innovation must run a gauntlet of policies
and doctrines, and local responses to
local co nditions must pass through
levels of bureaucratic filters.
Furthermore, most projects suffer all the typical problems of systems
with third-parry fundin g. A handful
of distant age ncies disburse most
demining money, so these donors
(plus army headquarters when the
deminers are acrive-dury soldiers) become the projects' true clients; the

people living in mine-infested areas are
simply powerless beneficiaries. Priorities of donors and national officials
often crump rhe needs of de miners and
mined communities.
Accountability is the reason usually given for bureaucratic structures,
but small spending for actual
demining is the reality, irrespective of
justification for high overhead. The
Bosnia Mine Action Center, despite
eno rmous spending since 1995, has
nor even finished its preliminary task
of mapping all mine fields, much less
accomplished sizable clearance. Even
mine fields around Sarajevo remain
unmarked, a fact that was tragically
proven last year when two children
were killed instantly and a third died
slowly within earshot of her parents
whi le Norwegian People's A id
deminers tried frantically to rescue her.
H owever, with more than 3,000 personnel, CMAC cleared only 10 sq km
per year our of some 3,500 affected
square kilometers.
W hen accountability is de-emphasized ro allow greater efficiency,
however, abuses occur. The U ni ted
Nations for years praised CMAC as a
model of effectiveness and
"susrainability." Recent exposure of
nepotism , ineffi ciency and misfeasance in CMAC (specifically, the clearing of land for the commercial use of
former Khmer Rouge officers) led to
funding cutoffs and contraction. Some
who have worked with LAO-UXO in
Laos allege that it would collapse without expatriate advisers. LAO-UXO
may be more robust than that, but an
exodus of expatriates would likely
cause foreig n donors to lose co nfidence, causing LAO-UXO to shut
down from lack of funds.
A recent U.N. policy review, noting the prevalence of "poor management compounded by inappropriate
and unsupporrive U.N. administrative
and budgetary mechanisms, lack of
forward planning and disputed lines
of authority," recommended that the

U ni ted Nations "not be involved in the
direct implementation of mine action
acrivi ties." 1
Even the most efficient programs
are expensive. Total monthly expenses
for the Afghanistan Mine Action Program, for example, run $800 (U.S.)
p er deminer, only $ 150 of which is
actual wages; the rest is equipmem,
transport, food accommodations, insurance, medical support, etc. Total
costs for the program's five expatriate
supervisors reach $250,000 each. 2 The
unfortunate result of all these factors
is that clearance costs more than most
agricultural land is worth. This eliminates one of the most powerful incentives for investing in demining- the
lure of positive returns on investments.
Private landowners will not invest in
land clearance unless rhey expect to
make a profit in order to support their
families. Likewise, a government ministry in a poo r country will no t invest
in clearing large areas if it cannot expeer positive net revenues, even considering the economic and social value
of avoiding injuries and deaths. It must
invest irs limited funds in growth and
development, no t simply spend in
ways that may produce net reductions
in collective economic well being.
Improvements in Planning
Demining

T he picture is not entirely dismal.
Coordination between military and
civilian organizations has improved,
and the United Nations has responded
to critiques by beginning to focus on
the coordination among, rather than
the actual operations of, NGO s.
Additionally, in an attempt to
march needs with available resources,
demining planners now apply triage
to lands (i.e., prioritize them according to risk and necessity and authorize "treatment" acco rding to these
priorities). Obviously, acure threats
such as min ed schoolyards and water
sources are treated immediately even
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at great cost. Ideally, public infrastructure and rransportation are cleared
next, then private infrastructure and
productive lands, and finally low-value
lands such as pastures and wastelands.
The desired treatments for these
various levels of need have evolved into
three accepted risk-reduction "treatment levels." From the top, Level3 is
complete clearing (the most expensive), akin to acute care; Level2 is demarcation of mine field perimeters
(meant to put mined land in a safe
holding pattern while making the
unmined surrounding land available);
and Level 1 is an aspirin-like treatment, generating general location data
and impact information for planning
purposes, accompanied by mine
awareness training that is often ineffective.
Unfortunately, funds are too limited in many cases even to clear the
most critical areas, much less mark
mine fields to keep people safely out.
Even when funds are ava ilable, the
middle level of care is largely unattainable because Level 2 surveys apply the
same labor-intensive techniques used
for clearance itself, which is very expensive, especially in densely vegetated
areas.
In order to make serious headway,
overall performance must increase dramatically without expecting increased
public funding. T he challenge is enormous, and responsible agencies must
go beyond easy fixes-they must make
substantial changes in their organizatio n and procedures and bring along
do nors and affected constituencies in
both mined and donor countries.
Getting started requires three
strategic responses:
• adopting the utilitarian publicheal th philosophy,
• immediady implementing measures to improve perfo rmance within
existing institutional constraints,
• providing a several -year effort
to create systemic flexibility, improve

...
options and transition demining institutions towards a true public-health
demining system.
The Ut1l1tanan Approach to
Reducing Societal Threat

Notwithstanding the humane
concern underlying all public-health
programs, economic rationality and
practicality govern attacks on everything from typhus epidemics to airplane crashes because it is impossible
to protect everyone completely in a
world with finite resources.
To end a typhus epidemic, for
example, officials divide funds and efforts among acute care, programs of
prevention and behavioral change, and
construction of sanitation infrastructure. Similarly, to reduce airplane accidents, officials simultaneously promote safety in design, manufacture
and operation. Attempting to eradicate all flies that carry typhus at the
expense of other variables would be an
ineffective (and Sisyphean) strategy, as
would spending all available funds to
build a "perfect" airplane while leaving flight operations unregulated. In
both cases, working to eliminate a
single risk factor results in more deaths
than a strategy of risk reduction that
is optimized but incomplete.
Striving to achieve a perfect solution for a single aspect of public-health
problems wastes resources. The fundamental premise is that the whole
population is better off (i.e., stays
healthier and lives longer) if all people
are protected to some degree than if a
few are protected completely. Instead
of focusing resources on a small portion of the population, public-health
workers apply a significant proportion
of their resources in a relatively thin
layer over large groups, perhaps even
entire populations.
So it should be with demining.
Every day, people and livestock stray
into unmarked and unfenced mine
fields, and every day, dozens of people

succumb to the odds they face there.
Reducing aggregate threat levels (i.e.,
reducing the odds of encountering a
mine in all populated areas) would
reduce death and injury more than the
present practice of expending almost
all resources on eliminating mines
completely in only a few places. This
method would also contribute more
to economic development, political
stability and tax generation.
Public-health programs a nd
methodologies vary considerably by
disease and social setting. Some methods are primarily epidemiologicalidentifYing causes. Others are sociological; (e.g., working to change hygiene habits) or public-works-oriented
(building sanitary water and sewage
systems to interrupt disease cycles). All
programs share two goals: 1. to implement the most effective strategic attack on the epidemic, in order to stop
it in irs tracks and turn it around, and
2. to maximize effectiveness per dollar invested.
Not coincidentally, the second
goal flows from the first. Good public-health programs exploit the weaknesses of their disease adversaries and
reinvent themselves as they confront
new conditions. Using tools from the
fields of ep idemiology, economics,
sociology and political science, among
others, programs analyze nor only the
disease but also the social and technical advantages and impediments faced
in the struggle against disease.
Public-health officials are not magicians but pragmatists. They attempt
to maximize organizational effectiveness and optimize use of available resources in order to minimize aggregate
death and injury. This requires constantly analyzing and tinkering with
organ izational functioning; developing, resting and refining improvemems;
integrating new technologies; and continually attending to stakeholders at all
levels. Ignoring any single element
threatens optimization efforts.
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A Public-Health Approach
Immediate Practical Measures:
mproving Performance Within
:Xisting Constraints3

Years of deminer debates and
complaints prompt the following suggestions:
• Measure efficiently. Funding
agencies increasingly understand that
the true measures of demining efficacy
are reduced casualty rates and increased land available for safe use.
Emphasis on mines cleared, in contrast, penalizes Level 2 surveys while
rewarding the clearance of unimportant mine fields that are dense.
• Freely share approaches, methods
and knowledge. Successful companies
and NGOs have expert knowledge;
they should be included in planning.
Voluntary standards and free exchange
of information, though messy, will
stimulate cooperation across the spectrum of demining organizations.
• Promote local civilian involvement in prioritizing and scheduling.
Program managers believe, understandably, that they know how to set
up demining projects best. However,
local residents are the experts on many
local matters. There is no substitute
for eliciting unmediated local knowledge and preferences on such issues as
the relative values of land.
• Attack Level 2 surveying with a
vengeance. Level2 surveys only require
that the mine fields be detected and
marked. Mechanical detonators are
more than adequate for this task.
Combining detection and confirmation (an explosion denotes both), mechanical detonators allow quick area
coverage without exposing personnel
to danger, thus increasing survey speed
while reducing cost. (This topic will
be addressed at length in a companion article in the next issue of this journal.4) Because dogs are difficult to deploy ubiquitously, they should be used
as complements to detonators in order to increase the total area surveyed.

• Emphasize tooth, not tail. Funding agencies need to remember that
reporting does not clear mines. While
accountability and unbiased measures
of success are necessary, data gathering and reporting should be secondary to aiding deminers in the field.
Demining teams can be trained to
collect and submit data in the ordinary course of their activities. Bureaucratic operations must not swallow
project budgets.
• Encourage and reward innovation. If their thoughtfulness is taken
seriously, local personnel will feel more
responsible for and committed to
projects.
• Procure equipment that is right
for the conditions. The "toolbox" idea
that ma ny different technologies
should be developed and deployed for
different conditions is honored more
in the breach chan in the practice.
Rich-country military R&D has produced rich-country military machines.
Building wonderful machines that
deminers cannot afford ro buy and
maintain is of little help. Successful
technologies optimize price, utility and
operating cost within the socioeconomic circumstances of a country's use.
Because labor is relatively cheap and
capital is expensive in d eveloping
countries, preferred equipment may be
different from that favored in the developed world. 5 National inventories
should allow deminers ready access to
the best detector for the soil and logistical conditions they face, and remoreconrrol brush cutters should be made
widely available in order to speed up
one of the slowest steps in demining.
Transition of Institutions:
Relaxing Constraints and
Enhancing Adaptive Response

In the longer term, to better enhance economic rationality, it is possible to vary organizational fundamentals such as:

• Decentralize and adopt appropriate civilian management and methods.
Centralization is often justified by the
low sophistication of local personnel.
Advanced training and education of
local employees could remedy this,
though initial expense would increase.
The organizational model for public
projects should migrate towards small
teams that can operate quasi-independently and foster team spirit. Field
workers could then assume more responsibility, thereby reducing management and coordination burdens.
• Improve regulatory oversight. Independent organizations, whether
public or private, should be contracted
for quality assurance and funded w rhe
level required to assure quality regulatory oversight and public confidence.
(Terra Segura International, the corporate author of this article, has developed a phased turnkey pilot project
implementing this concept.) One byproduct will be greater transparency,
reducing the likelihood of serious trespasses.
• Digitally link goods and services
across complementary industries. Mines
are intensely local problems, bur support and resources for their clearance
are global. Electronic management of
demining goods and services and acquisition through organizations that
possess logical relationships with the
mine problem can increase efficiency
while bearing new resources.
• Promote the growth ofmine-clearance markets. The salvation of mined
countries will truly begin when the
private sector starts investing to
remediare mined lands as a way to capture revenues from use. The above
measures will create conditions for the
safe growth of local land remediation
markets. International insti tutions
working through microcredit lenders
can help capitalize local demining contractors, as well as make grants and
loans to their customers. As costs fall,
more pnvate demining teams will

spring up, enhancing competition,
innovation, differentiation and specialization. Demand for demining services will grow as it becomes profitable to reclaim more and more land,
and more private capital will flow into
clearing. International and governmental agencies will be able to shift
their primary focus to regulation, quality assurance and economic developmenr, benefiting victims and poor
landholders.
Conclusion: The Larger Benefits
of a Public-Health Approach

In mined countries, poverty is the
rule, and devastation is both cause and
effect. Most land has low economic
value relative to land in rich countries,
and expected revenues are small. This
makes most demining economically
irrational and therefore unsustainable.
Mine clearance depends on philanthropy, a funding stream that is presently inadequate and possibly subject
to erosion. Changing this picture will
require careful but dramatic action.
Better humanitarian demining is
justifiable on the basis of faster casuairy reductions at lower cost. Bur the
benefits go far beyond this. As
demining costs fall and investments in
land remediation increase, economic
activity of all kinds will recover and
expand. The result will be more prosperity and political stability, reduced
reliance on economic assistance, fewer
economic causes of conflict, and less
need for foreign military interference
and peacekeeping. •
This article is based on a paper Mr. Wolf
presented to rhe UXO/Counrermine Forum, New
Orleans, April 9-12, 200 I .
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